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I. INTRODUCTION 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection1 represents the Supreme Court’s first effort 
to address the problem of judicial takings. The Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment states that “private property” cannot be “taken 
without just compensation.”2 Until Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
however, the Court had never considered the question of whether an 
action by the judicial branch of government can ever be a “taking” 
requiring the payment of compensation. 
Unfortunately, a divided Court failed to resolve the issue, which is 
now left for future cases. A plurality opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia ruled that judicial takings do indeed exist, but only four of the 
eight justices joined it.3 Two Justices—Anthony Kennedy and Sonia 
Sotomayor—signed on to a concurring opinion authored by Justice 
Kennedy, which contended that the issue of judicial takings under the 
Fifth Amendment should be left for future resolution and that judicial 
actions similar to takings might instead be barred by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 
 
*Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful suggestions and 
comments, I would like to thank the participants in the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and 
Public Policy symposium on judicial takings, and the editors of this Journal. I would also like to 
thank Eric Facer and Eva Choi for their valuable research assistance. 
 1. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 3. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601–02. 
 4. Id. at 2613–18 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Justice Breyer wrote a concurrence arguing that the entire issue of 
judicial takings should not have been addressed by the Court, which 
instead should simply have ruled that there is no judicial taking in this 
case regardless of whether judicial takings might ever occur 
elsewhere.5 In sum, there is no majority for any position on the 
question of whether judicial takings exist at all or, if so, what factors 
determine whether a particular judicial action qualifies as a taking. 
For this reason, the question of judicial takings still remains to be 
addressed by future Supreme Court decisions. 
This article argues that judicial takings do exist and are forbidden 
by the Fifth Amendment. I also explain why this conclusion would not 
require federal courts to take on any unusual administrative burdens. 
I do not consider several other important issues raised by Stop the 
Beach Renourishment, such as whether some judicial takings might 
also violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
whether the Florida Supreme Court’s actions in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment itself should be considered a taking requiring 
compensation, or whether Justices Breyer and Kennedy were right to 
suggest that the Court should have avoided addressing the issue of 
whether judicial takings exist in this case. 
Part II of this article briefly discusses the background of the case. 
In Part III, I defend Justice Scalia’s conclusion that “the Takings 
Clause bars the State from taking private property without paying for 
it, no matter which branch is the instrument of the taking.”6 This 
principle follows logically from both the text and the original meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment. Various rationales for distinguishing judicial 
takings from other takings do not overturn this simple, but sound, 
conclusion. 
Part IV addresses the claim that enforcing a takings doctrine 
would lead federal courts into severe practical difficulties. A judicial 
takings doctrine does not require legal principles significantly 
different from or more complicated than other takings claims. Justice 
Breyer and others are wrong to suggest that such a doctrine would 
“invite a host of federal takings claims” that federal judges would be 
unable to handle.7 
 
 5. Id. at 2618–19 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 6. Id. at 2602 (plurality opinion). 
 7. Id. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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II. BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
Under Florida’s Beach and Shore Preservation Act (the Act),8 the 
state government is required to establish “renourishment” projects to 
restore waterfront land that has become “critically eroded.”9 Once the 
projects are complete, the Act gives the state title to any newly dry 
land that has been cleared as a result of the project’s displacement of 
the waterline. This deprives waterfront property owners of their 
previously existing right to ownership of land up to the “mean high 
water line” (MHWL).10 This is exactly what happened to the six 
waterfront property owners in Florida’s Walton County, whose land 
abutted a renourishment project established in the area.11 The 
property owners formed a group called Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, which became the petitioner in this case.12 
The project in their area resulted in the creation of additional dry 
land between the property owners’ holdings and the ocean—land that 
was claimed by the state. The property owners argued that the state’s 
acquisition of land inside the MHWL constitutes a taking that 
requires compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court ruled against the property 
owners, holding that state law did not give them the right to own all 
property up to the new MHWL created by the project.13 
The property owners then appealed the decision to the federal 
Supreme Court, arguing that the state supreme court decision worked 
a taking by upsetting long-established property rights, thereby 
requiring compensation under the Fifth Amendment. 
III. JUDICIAL TAKINGS ARE JUST PLAIN TAKINGS 
Judicial takings are ultimately no different from takings carried 
out by other government actors. The text and original meaning of the 
Constitution provide no basis for distinguishing between the two. 
 
 8. Beach and Shore Preservation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.011–161.242 (West 2010). 
 9. Ilya Somin, Does Denying Property Owners Ownership Rights to Land Up to the Water 
Line Amount to a “Judicial Taking”? ABA PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS., 141 (Nov. 30, 2009) 
(summarizing the facts of Stop the Beach Renourishment). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1121 (Fla. 
2008), aff'd sub nom. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. 
Ct. 2592 (2010). 
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Neither do Supreme Court precedents applying other parts of the Bill 
of Rights. Various efforts to distinguish judicial takings are ultimately 
unpersuasive. 
A. The Text and Original Meaning of the Takings Clause 
The Fifth Amendment states that “private property” may not be 
“taken without just compensation.”14 Nowhere does it distinguish 
between takings conducted by the judiciary and those carried out by 
any other branch of government. As Justice Scalia puts it in his Stop 
the Beach Renourishment opinion,  
[t]he Takings Clause . . . is not addressed to the action of a specific 
branch or branches. It is concerned simply with the act, and not 
with the governmental actor . . . . There is no textual justification 
for saying that the existence or the scope of a State’s power to 
expropriate private property without just compensation varies 
according to the branch of government effecting the 
expropriation.15 
The simple textual solution to the judicial takings quandary is to 
assume that whatever action qualifies as a taking if conducted by the 
legislature or the executive also does so if done by a state judge. This 
approach conforms to the original meaning of the Takings Clause as 
understood at the time of the Founding. As Justice Kennedy points 
out and Justice Scalia acknowledges, the framers and ratifiers of the 
Bill of Rights did not specifically consider the question of judicial 
takings.16 But neither did they in any way indicate that judicial action 
was to be excluded from the general prohibitory language of the 
Takings Clause.17 
Justice Scalia suggests that the Framers did not consider the 
problem of judicial takings because they lived in an era when courts 
were believed to be unable to “change” the common law.18 Whether or 
not this is true, the dominant view during the Founding era was that 
private property is a natural right that no government agency has the 
power to change.19 James Madison, the principal drafter of the Takings 
 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 15. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 
(2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 16. Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion), 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 2606 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 19. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 877 (2004) (analyzing in detail eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
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Clause, described “the personal right to acquire property” as a 
“natural right” that “gives to property, when acquired, a right to 
protection, as a social right.”20 In his famous 1792 essay on property, 
written the year after the enactment of the Bill of Rights, Madison 
emphasized that “[g]overnment is instituted to protect property of 
every sort” and that a government that even “indirectly violates [the 
people’s] property” rights cannot be considered “just” and “is not a 
pattern for the United States.”21 Obviously, government cannot be 
instituted to protect property rights or considered unjust for violating 
them if the rights in question were simply its own creations to begin 
with. In Madison’s view, and that of most of the Founding generation, 
government was required to protect property rights and did not have 
the power to redefine them at will.22 
Thus, the original understanding of the Takings Clause did not 
assume that property rights were simply the creations of state 
governments or that either courts or legislatures had unconstrained 
authority to redefine them. From an originalist perspective, Justice 
Scalia was too sweeping in his assertion in Stop the Beach 
Renourishment that “[t]he Takings Clause only protects property 
rights as they are established under state law, not as they might have 
been established or ought to have been established.”23 
The textualist and originalist conclusion that judicial takings are 
no different from other takings is in line with the Supreme Court’s 
treatment of judicial infringements of other rights protected by the 
Bill of Rights. For example, in the famous case of New York Times v. 
Sullivan,24 the Supreme Court ruled that a state judicial libel judgment 
violated the First Amendment.25 The Court rejected the libel plaintiff’s 
argument that the First Amendment did not apply to state judicial 
decisions in private civil actions, holding that 
 
conceptions of natural property rights and takings); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF 
EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 42–59 (3d. ed. 
2008) (examining natural rights views of the founding era); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 103–04, 152–53 (1992) 
(discussing the “conventional wisdom” of the Founding era, that property was a natural right). 
 20. NEDELSKY, supra note 19, at 29. 
 21. James Madison, Property, [1792], 515, 517, IN MADISON, WRITINGS (Library of 
America, 1999). 
 22. See generally, NEDELSKY, supra note 19 (discussing that property was a natural right 
under the “conventional wisdom” of the Founding era). 
 23. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2612. 
 24. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 25. Id. at 265. 
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[i]t matters not [under the First Amendment] that that law has 
been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, 
though supplemented by statute. . . . The test is not the form in 
which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, 
whether such power has in fact been exercised.26 
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, Justice Scalia cites the case of 
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,27 in which the Court concluded 
that a state property-law ruling violated the First Amendment rights 
of protestors.28 The text of the Fifth Amendment does not distinguish 
between courts and legislatures any more than that of the First 
Amendment. 
B. Possible Rationales for Treating Judicial Takings Differently from 
Other Judicial Infringements on Constitutional Rights 
Despite the plain text of the Constitution and the parallel 
treatment of judicial infringements of other constitutional rights, 
some scholars argue that judicial takings should not be forbidden by 
federal courts.29 They advance a variety of arguments, including claims 
that state courts are, by definition, incapable of committing a taking, 
that courts are unlikely to engage in the sorts of “majoritarian” abuses 
that the Takings Clause was supposedly enacted in order to prevent, 
and that federal intervention against judicial takings requires an 
assumption that courts are inevitably “political.” None of these claims 
withstands scrutiny. 
One of the most influential arguments against the idea of judicial 
takings, advanced by Justice Kennedy in his concurring opinion in 
Stop the Beach Renourishment, is that courts by definition cannot 
commit a taking because they lack the power of eminent domain, 
which is a legislative function.30 As Justice Kennedy puts it, “[w]hen 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 28. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2601–02 (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980)). 
 29. See, e.g., John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary is 
Different, 35 VT. L. REV. 475 (2010) (arguing that the Takings Clause should not apply to 
judicial actions); Richard Ruda, Do We Really Need a Judicial Takings Doctrine? 35 VT. L. REV. 
451 (2010). For recent defenses of the idea of judicial takings in the wake of Stop the Beach 
Renourishment, see also D. Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, RICHMOND 
L. REV. (forthcoming), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016& 
context=benjamin_barros; and Ilya Shapiro & Trevor Burrus, Judicial Takings and Scalia’s 
Shifting Sands, 35 VT. L. REV 423 (2010). 
 30. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614–15 (Kennedy, J., concurring). This 
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courts act without direction from the executive or legislature, they 
may not have the power to eliminate established property rights by 
judicial decision” and therefore cannot commit a taking.31 In the 
words of one academic defender of Justice Kennedy’s argument, “[i]f 
the courts lack the power to ‘take’ within the meaning of the Takings 
Clause, their decisions obviously cannot give rise to takings claims.”32 
This argument is flawed for three reasons. First, even if the court’s 
action is illegal under state law that does not mean that it cannot also 
qualify as a taking under federal constitutional law. There is no reason 
why the action of a state court or other state government agency 
cannot violate both state law and the federal Constitution 
simultaneously. Justice Kennedy appears to assume that a government 
action only qualifies as a “taking” if it is permissible under state law. 
But nothing in either the text of the Takings Clause or Supreme Court 
precedent requires that conclusion.33 
Second, whether a state court has the power to “take” property is 
a question of state law, not federal constitutional law. No federal law 
prevents state governments from authorizing their courts to take 
private property. Thus, a state-court action that amounts to a taking is 
not inevitably illegal under state law. 
Finally, as Justice Scalia noted, Justice Kennedy’s argument is 
premised on the notion that courts lack the power to allocate 
financial compensation as required for a taking.34 Compensation, 
however, has never been the exclusive remedy for a violation of the 
Takings Clause. “Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, 
the government retains the whole range of options already 
available—amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the 
invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain.”35 
 
argument is also defended by Echeverria, supra note 29, at 487–88. 
 31. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2614. 
 32. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 487. 
 33. In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005), the Court stated “the 
Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public purpose.” 
In context, however, it is clear that the Court was referring merely to whether the Takings 
Clause had met the requirements of the federal Constitution, including having a valid “public 
use” and meeting the terms of Due Process Clause. See id. (stating that “if a government action 
is found to be impermissible—for instance because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement 
or is so arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the inquiry”). The Court’s main 
point was that a federal court’s inquiry into the “propriety” of a taking is separate from inquiry 
into compensation. 
 34. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2607. 
 35. First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
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A second possible rationale for excluding judicial takings from 
federal scrutiny, developed by Professor John Echeverria, is that the 
Takings Clause is intended to protect against “majoritarian” abuses of 
property owners by elected officials, whereas courts are “generally 
anti-majoritarian” institutions whose task is the impartial 
enforcement of law.36 
The Supreme Court has famously stated that “[t]he Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a 
public use without just compensation was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”37 But no Supreme Court decision has ever ruled that takings 
claims can only prevail if the government acted out of “majoritarian” 
motives. Uncompensated takings, like other violations of 
constitutional rights, can also arise out of the machinations of 
minority interest groups or mistakes by well-meaning government 
officials. Because of widespread voter ignorance, much legislative and 
executive activity escapes meaningful majoritarian control by the 
voters.38 The fact that a law violating constitutional rights was adopted 
by the legislature does not necessarily mean that it was 
“majoritarian.” Takings of private property are often undertaken at 
the behest of small, well-organized interest groups.39 
The Supreme Court has never sought to determine whether a 
taking was motivated by majoritarian pressures, lobbying by 
influential minority interest groups, or some combination of the two. 
Furthermore, nothing in the text or original meaning of the Takings 
Clause requires it to do so. Indeed, the adoption of the Clause was 
partially motivated by fear of uncompensated “impressment” of 
private property by unaccountable federal officials against the will of 
the people.40 
 
 
 36. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 487–90. 
 37. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 38. See generally Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A 
New Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1287 
(2004). 
 39. See Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development Takings After 
Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 190–203 (2007) (discussing this general problem and giving 
examples). 
 40. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 
79–80 (1998). 
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Moreover, courts are far from immune to majoritarian influence. 
Many states, including Florida, have elected judiciaries and judicial 
campaigns have become more competitive in recent years.41 Professor 
Echeverria argues that any judicial takings doctrine adopted by the 
Court must also apply to federal judges, whom he claims are 
“insulat[ed] as much as possible from majoritarian influence” by life 
tenure.42 Trends in public opinion, however, still have a substantial 
impact on federal-court decisions.43 Courts may be more insulated 
from majority public opinion than legislatures. But they are still 
significantly influenced by it. 
In his article for this symposium,44 Professor William Marshall 
worries that recognizing the existence of political influence on state 
courts risks giving in to the “legal realist” notion that judging is purely 
political, with jurists simply voting their political preferences under 
the guise of following legal doctrine. However, acknowledging the 
existence of political influence on state courts does not mean that all, 
or even most, decisions are political. Acknowledging it merely means 
that state courts are not completely free of political influence. One 
need not be a thoroughgoing legal realist to believe that political 
pressure sometimes influences judges. 
Even where political influence is present, it does not necessarily 
imply that the affected judges are deliberately subordinating the law 
to political considerations. The influence could take the form of a 
political coalition appointing or electing judges who are likely to 
support its political agenda for purely jurisprudential reasons. The 
judges themselves might have a completely sincere belief in the legal 
correctness of their decisions. Overall, Professor Marshall is wrong to 
assume that recognizing a cause of action for judicial takings 
necessarily requires federal judges to conclude that state-court 
decision-making is infected by politics.45 Even state judges completely 
immune to political influence might engage in judicial takings as a 
 
 41. See Matthew J. Streb, The Study of Judicial Elections, IN RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE 
RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Matthew J. 
Streb ed., 2007) (discussing the increasing influence of politics on judges). See also Echeverria, 
supra note 29, at 489 (acknowledging the influence of judicial elections on courts). 
 42. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 489. 
 43. For a recent survey of the evidence, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE 
PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE 
MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 44. See William P. Marshall, Judicial Takings, Judicial Speech, and Doctrinal Acceptance of 
the Model of the Judge as Political Actor, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2011). 
 45. Id. 
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result of honest intellectual error. 
 In sum, the “majoritarian” argument against the judicial takings 
doctrine errs both in assuming that the Takings Clause only protects 
against majoritarian abuses and that courts are insulated from 
majoritarian pressures. 
A closely related argument is that state courts do not need as 
much federal judicial oversight of their takings practices as political 
officials because of the superior legal expertise of the former.46 If 
judicial professionalism makes judges less likely to “impair federal 
constitutional values” than “the other branches,” that suggests that 
fewer meritorious takings claims will be brought against judicial 
action than legislative or executive action.47 But the fact that a 
particular branch of state government is less likely to violate the 
Constitution than other branches is no reason to exempt its actions 
from federal scrutiny when it does. Moreover, the same argument 
would apply with equal force to all other constitutional rights. If state 
judges are so professional that federal scrutiny under the Takings 
Clause is unnecessary, why should federal courts review state 
decisions for possible First Amendment or Fourth Amendment 
violations? 
Finally, Justice Breyer and at least one academic commentator 
suggest that a judicial takings doctrine would undermine state courts’ 
power to determine state property law.48 The obvious answer to this 
argument is that state legislatures also have sovereign authority over 
state property law. Indeed, their power overrides that of state courts 
except in cases where a legislative enactment violates the state 
constitution. Yet no one argues on this basis that state legislative 
enactments on property law should be free of judicial review for 
possible Takings Clause violations. 
IV. POTENTIAL PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES 
Even if a judicial takings doctrine is sound in principle, its 
implementation could lead to serious practical difficulties. Both 
 
 46. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 492. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(expressing fear that a judicial takings doctrine would require federal judges to “play a major 
role in the shaping of a matter of significant state interest—state property law”); Norman Siegel, 
Why We Will Probably Never See a Judicial Takings Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 459, 461–62 (2010) 
(arguing that a judicial takings doctrine would undermine state-court power to shape property 
law). 
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academic critics49 and Justice Breyer50 have raised several objections 
along these lines. Their most important concerns are federal judges’ 
lack of expertise on state legal doctrines and the danger of opening 
the floodgates to numerous lawsuits challenging routine judicial 
rulings. Both fears, however, are greatly overstated. 
A. The Problem of Expertise 
In his concurring opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Justice 
Breyer worries that a judicial takings doctrine would require 
“constitutional review of many, perhaps large numbers of, state-law 
cases in an area of law familiar to state, but not federal, judges.”51 
Academic critics of Justice Scalia’s position have made similar 
claims.52 The supposedly superior property-law expertise of state 
courts and other state officials is a standard argument deployed 
against federal judicial enforcement of constitutional property rights 
generally.53 Elsewhere, I have responded to it in greater detail.54 Here, 
I address only those aspects of it that relate to judicial takings. 
There are two major problems with the expertise argument 
against the judicial takings doctrine. First, if taken seriously, the 
expertise argument applies to many other areas of constitutional law 
as well. In almost every area of constitutional law where litigants 
challenge the constitutionality of state laws, federal courts must 
determine what the state law means before deciding whether it 
violates the federal constitution. Federal judges also routinely 
consider the meaning of state law in diversity cases, where parties 
litigating cases under state law choose to do so in federal court 
 
 49. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 48, at 461. 
 50. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2618 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 51. Id. at 2619. 
 52. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 48, at 461 (noting that state courts “have a special ability to 
develop rules of property grounded in the individual State's unique history and physical 
landscape” and that this is an area of law with which federal judges are generally unfamiliar); 
Stacy L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Court 
Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107 (2011). 
 53. See, e.g., Roderick Hills, Jr., How Federalism Inevitably Trumps Taking Doctrine—And 
a Good Thing Too, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 18, 2010), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/ 
2010/06/how-federalism-inevitably-trumps-takings-doctrine-1.html (arguing that the greater 
expertise of state judges over the details of state property law should obviate the need for 
federal oversight); US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Testimony of Thomas A. Merrill, 
Testimony in The Kelo Decision: Investigating Takings of Homes and Other Private Property, at 
5 (Sept 20, 2005), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint=1&id=1612 
&wit_id=4661. 
 54. See Ilya Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, U. CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming 2011). 
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because they are citizens of different states.55 
Second, many areas of constitutional law require federal courts to 
analyze local conditions on which state officials and state judges are 
likely to have superior knowledge. For example, Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure cases depend on judgments of “reasonableness,” in 
which local conditions play a crucial role.56 The Supreme Court 
acknowledges that the reasonableness of a search often depends on 
“the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and 
events of the community,” about which local judges and “law 
enforcement officers” may have specialized “expertise.”57 Yet that 
does not mean that federal judges must simply defer to state judges’ 
assessments of Fourth Amendment claims. Similar local expertise 
issues arise with other areas of federal constitutional law, including 
freedom of speech and Establishment Clause claims.58 
Assessing state property law might well be an easier task for 
federal judges than understanding other variations in state law and 
local conditions. There is considerable standardization of basic 
property law across state and local lines. For example, nearly all 
common-law jurisdictions divide property into a few basic types of 
estates with standardized packages of rights.59 Standardization is also 
promoted by the influence of the Restatement of Property Law and 
various treatises.60 
A variation on the expertise argument is that state judges are 
better qualified to assess whether a taking has occurred by unduly 
changing state law than federal judges are, due to the superior 
knowledge of state property law of the former.61 The possibly superior 
expertise of state judges on state law, however, is counterbalanced by 
the superior expertise of federal judges with respect to federal 
 
 55. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (West 2005) (authorizing diversity jurisdiction lawsuits). 
 56. See Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 54. 
 57. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996); see also United States v. Brown, 310 
F. App’x 776, 778 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting relevance of “understanding local conditions” in 
determining whether a search is reasonable); United States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d 840, 847 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (claiming that local courts have an institutional advantage in ascertaining a search’s 
reasonableness because they better understand local conditions). 
 58. See Somin, Federalism and Property Rights, supra note 54, at 28–33. 
 59. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry M. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (2000) (discussing the 
standardization of property rights across common-law jurisdictions). 
 60. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v. 
Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 41 (1997). 
 61. See Dogan & Young, supra note 52. 
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constitutional law. As with any constitutional claim challenging the 
validity of a state government action, judges will have to interpret 
both the relevant state law and the federal constitutional law that 
applies to the situation. 
Moreover, in practice, most state judges are not property-law 
experts. It is not clear that a state judge without special expertise in 
property law will have significantly greater knowledge than a federal 
judge from the same geographic region. Federal district judges, for 
example, generally hail from the states where they sit, and often 
practiced in those states before their appointment to the federal 
bench.62 Senators also seek to ensure that their states are well-
represented on the courts of appeals.63 There is thus no reason to 
believe that federal judges sitting in a given state are likely to be less 
expert on relevant property law than state judges in the same area. 
B. Opening the Lawsuit Floodgates? 
The second major practical objection to a judicial takings doctrine 
is the fear that it would open the floodgates for numerous lawsuits 
against routine state judicial decisions. As Justice Breyer puts it, a 
judicial takings doctrine 
would invite a host of federal takings claims . . . . Property owners 
litigate many thousands of cases involving state property law in 
state courts each year . . . . Losing parties in many state-court cases 
may well believe that erroneous judicial decisions have deprived 
them of property rights they previously held and may 
consequently bring federal takings claims.64 
Others have raised the same concern.65 
Such claims are, at best, exaggerated. Property owners are only 
likely to file judicial takings cases in federal court if they believe that 
they have a strong enough case to justify the cost of litigation. It 
seems highly unlikely that the Supreme Court will adopt a judicial 
takings test that gives property owners greater protection than its 
current regulatory takings doctrine for legislative and administrative 
 
 62. See C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS 87–116 (1996) (discussing “home-state recruitment” of district judges). 
 63. SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 319–23 (1997). 
 64. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2618–19 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 65. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 48, at 461–62 (arguing that “the doctrine would encourage 
dissatisfied litigants to argue that a state court has taken property without payment of just 
compensation because it has issued a decision that purportedly departs from prior holdings”). 
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takings. And the latter is quite deferential. Government actions are 
only considered “per se” takings if they involve a permanent physical 
occupation of property,66 or if they permanently deprive the owner of 
“all economically beneficial or productive use” of his property.67 Even 
a temporary but very long-lasting 100% deprivation of all 
economically valuable use is insufficient.68 
All other takings claims are assessed under the so-called Penn 
Central test, which sets out three factors that must be weighed in 
determining whether a regulatory action that does not involve a 
physical invasion of property is a taking: “[t]he economic impact of 
the regulation on the claimant,” the “extent to which the regulation 
has interfered with distinct investment backed expectations,” and the 
“character of the government action.”69 
Courts generally apply the Penn Central test in ways that favor the 
government.70 In 2002, the Supreme Court majority itself indicated 
that the Penn Central test had become the “polestar” of its regulatory 
takings jurisprudence in large part because it shielded from 
invalidation “numerous practices that have long been considered 
permissible exercises of the police power.”71 A 2003 study of 133 cases 
decided under the test found that property owners prevailed less than 
10% of the time.72 
 
 66. Loretto v. Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982). 
 67. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 68. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) 
(discussing the severe negative implications of Tahoe-Sierra for regulatory takings claims); Ilya 
Somin, Taking Property Rights Seriously? The Supreme Court and the “Poor Relation” of 
Constitutional Law, George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper 08-53, 17–19 (2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1247854. For related criticisms of Tahoe-Sierra, see, e.g., 
Richard A. Epstein, The Ebbs and Flows of Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case, 
2002 CATO SUPREME COURT REV. 5 (2002). See also Eric R. Claeys, Takings and Private 
Property in the Rehnquist Court, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 187, 214–15 (2004) (concluding that the case 
essentially “limited Lucas to its facts”). 
 69. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978). 
 70. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property 
Theory, 30 HARV. ENV. L. REV. 339, 340–344 (2006) (arguing that the majority of the Court’s 
justices apply the Penn Central test in a way that is generally deferential to the government and 
noting that the “conventional wisdom” among “land-use lawyers” interprets the Court’s 
application of the test that way); Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 
34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 333 (2007) (noting that property owners rarely prevail in the Supreme 
Court under the Penn Central test). 
 71. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326 n.23 
(2002) (quotation omitted). 
 72. F. Patrick Hubbard, et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing Under the Ad 
Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENV. L. & 
POL’Y F. 121, 141–42 (2003). The owners won in 9.8% of cases overall and 13.4% of cases that 
reached the merits stage. Id. The authors claim that the 13% success rate is not especially low 
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Justice Scalia’s opinion in Stop the Beach Renourishment implies 
that the test for judicial takings might be less deferential than Penn 
Central; he notes that a judicial taking occurs if a state court 
concludes that “an established right of private property no longer 
exists.”73 Professor John Echeverria claims that this means that Justice 
Scalia “believes that a judicial taking occurs whenever a court ruling 
changes an ‘established’ rule of property law.”74 In the same 
paragraph, however, Justice Scalia writes that “[c]ondemnation by 
eminent domain, for example, is always a taking, while a legislative, 
executive, or judicial restriction of property use may or may not be, 
depending on its nature and extent.”75 This suggests that judicial 
takings claims should be subject to the same standards as legislative 
or executive takings claims. Regardless of Justice Scalia’s personal 
preferences, it is unlikely that a majority of the Court will agree to 
treat judicial takings claims more favorably than other takings. Given 
the deferential nature of established regulatory takings jurisprudence, 
it is highly unlikely that applying those standards to judicial takings 
claims will result in a flood of litigation. 
Obviously, more litigation can be expected if the Court were to 
adopt stronger rules for regulatory takings claims generally, a position 
that others and I have advocated.76 The additional litigation, however, 
would be justified if the case for a stronger regulatory takings 
jurisprudence is sound. After all, the new litigation would arise only 
because the federal courts had under-enforced a constitutional right 
for many years, thereby incentivizing state and federal officials to 
violate that right on a large scale. Historically, every effort to enforce 
constitutional rights after a long period of neglect has stimulated a 
wave of new litigation. For example, Brown v. Board of Education77 
 
when one considers that all but one of the cases where property owners lost were ones where 
low litigation costs or high potential rewards justified pursuing a case with a low probability of 
success. Id. However, the fact that nearly all of the Penn Central cases litigated in the authors’ 
sample involved cases where plaintiffs had incentives to go forward with even a low probability 
of success merely underscores the fact that the test is tilted against owners. Otherwise, we 
should observe a much larger number of cases where plaintiffs went forward despite the fact 
that they needed a substantial chance of winning in order to make the costs of litigation 
worthwhile. 
 73. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 74. Echeverria, supra note 29, at 476 (quoting Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 
2602). 
 75. Stop the Beach Renourishment, 130 S. Ct. at 2602 (emphasis added). 
 76. See Somin, Taking Property Rights Seriously, supra note 68, at 25–38. For the best-
known work advocating a much stronger regulatory takings standard, see RICHARD EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
 77. 347 U.S. 54 (1954). 
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led to a significant increase in race discrimination claims filed against 
state governments. Whether the benefits of the new litigation are 
worth the costs depends on whether state governments really have 
violated the constitutional right in question on a large scale. If the 
answer is yes, then the wave of lawsuits is an indication of the scale of 
the violations and the degree of federal intervention needed to curb 
them. Should the Supreme Court have decided Brown the other way 
in order to avoid the resulting increase in litigation? 
In the long term, of course, government officials likely will adjust 
their policies in response to newly strengthened judicial enforcement 
of rights, thereby reducing the flow of litigation. Moreover, as the new 
rules become better established and understood, litigants will be able 
to predict the likely outcome of takings claims and settle out of court. 
In this article, I do not try to make the case for a stronger 
regulatory takings jurisprudence. I only suggest that any such case 
would not be undermined by the need to enforce the Takings Clause 
against courts as well as other government actors. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Judicial takings are fundamentally similar to other takings. The 
fact that judges, rather than legislators or executive branch officials, 
enact them is irrelevant under the Constitution. No one doubts that 
judges are forbidden to violate other constitutional rights. Property 
rights protected by the Takings Clause are no different. 
Although the definition and enforcement of a judicial takings 
doctrine poses genuine challenges, these difficulties are fundamentally 
similar to those presented by other takings claims. There is room for 
wide-ranging disagreement over such issues as what kinds of 
government actions qualify as takings and how much compensation is 
owed to property owners in the event a taking occurs.78 But the 
answers to such questions should not turn on whether the case 
involves a judge or some other agent of the state. 
 
 
 78. See generally Glenn S. Lunney, Compensation for Takings: How Much is Just?, 42 
CATH. U. L. REV. 721 (1993) (describing various alternative methodologies for determining 
compensation). 
